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NO. 34 AUGUST 2019 Introduction 
Cyber Deterrence is Overrated 
Analysis of the Deterrent Potential of the New US Cyber Doctrine and Lessons 
for Germany’s “Active Cyber Defence” 
Matthias Schulze 
Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deter-
rent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking 
if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber 
capabilities should have a deterrent effect was one reason why the new US cyber 
doctrine was adopted in 2018. The same assumption is implicit in the debate about 
cyber counterattacks (“hack backs”) in Germany. Yet these assessments are based on a 
superficial understanding of deterrence. Cyber deterrence by the threat of retaliation 
works differently than that of nuclear deterrence. Problems of attribution, displays 
of power, controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities increase the risk of 
deterrence failure. Thus, the German cyber security policy would be well advised to 
increase its “deterrence by denial”, cyber security and the resilience of its systems. 
 
Currently, German cyber operators have 
no legal mandate to conduct disruptive 
cyber operations outside of German net-
works in peace time. For this reason, 
Germany has been debating active cyber 
defence or “hack backs” for the last few 
years. Active defence is designed to counter 
cyber intrusions by striking back at the 
originator with digital means. These retalia-
tions could be conducted by state entities, 
not private entities – in stark contrast to 
the US debate. Proponents of active defence 
argue that German state hackers should be 
able to penetrate networks of opponents 
to stop ongoing cyber attacks in real time, 
delete data or deactivate computers. 
There is another, more implicit argu-
ment in the debate for active cyber defence: 
a cyber attacker could, at least in theory, be 
deterred from an attack against Germany, if 
digital retaliation via “hack back” would be 
the consequence of such behaviour. This 
mirrors the argument that the presence of 
offensive cyber capabilities might create a 
deterrent effect. A similar justification was 
used for the establishment of the Bundes-
wehr Cyber and Information Domain 
service, a functional service of the armed 
forces in 2016. However, the effectiveness 
of cyber capabilities for deterrence is the 
subject of much debate in academic litera-
ture. The question thus arises as to whether 
cyber deterrence by hacking back or by 
punishment is an appropriate strategy for 
Germany. 
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Deterrence 
Deterrence is the potential use or threat 
of punishment to achieve a change in be-
haviour of an opponent. Deterrence is 
based on the formula that the offensive 
behaviour (X) of an attacker (A) can be 
changed by the defender (D), if he is threat-
ening him with negative consequences (Y). 
The logical formula for deterrence is: Do 
not do X, because otherwise consequences 
Y will follow. The cost of Y must outweigh 
the gains to be expected from an attack X. 
This form of deterrence always contains an 
element of coercion and is therefore called 
“deterrence by punishment”. It differs from 
“deterrence by denial”, which aims to in-
crease the cost of attacks by hardening 
systems and increasing resilience so that 
attacks no longer seem worthwhile. Unless 
otherwise stated, I mean deterrence by 
punishment when speaking of deterrence 
in this paper. 
In order for deterrence to work, at least 
three conditions must be met: 
∎ The threat of consequences must be 
clearly communicated and understood 
by all parties (“signaling”). 
∎ Both actors must have as complete 
information as possible about the capa-
bilities, intentions and ideally the 
thought processes of their counterparts 
in order to be able to rationally assess 
costs and benefits. 
∎ The threat of punishment must be 
credible, i.e. technically feasible and 
backed by political resolve. 
Successful deterrence requires the threat 
of punishment to be communicated in a 
clear, audible and, above all, credible man-
ner. Deterrence is considered successful if 
A does not perform an action, i.e. a cyber-
attack. The causality of a non-event cannot 
be proven logically. One can never say 
exactly whether it was the threat of punish-
ment that led to the change in behaviour, 
or whether there were other reasons for 
it. Consequently, deterrence is sometimes 
considered to be a myth in academic 
literature. 
Deterrence is based on Rational Choice 
Theory. The assumption is that actors weigh 
the costs and benefits of their actions and 
rationally choose the less costly option. The 
theory has been criticized because actors 
never have all objective information and 
can therefore never fully assess the con-
sequences of their actions. Furthermore, 
they often act irrationally, rely on bounded 
rationality, or act according to norms or 
habits. Deterrence works only in the head 
of the attacker, where one has no insight. 
So it is ultimately a guessing game: “I be-
lieve that you believe that I believe” and so 
on. The logical problem with all deterrence 
theories is that you never know if deter-
rence works, until it fails. 
Cyber Deterrence 
Transferring a deterrence strategy to the 
cyber domain is regarded as problematic by 
cyber security researchers. Nuclear deter-
rence was assumed to be successful due to 
unique conditions, i.e. the particularities 
of the bi-polar world and the extraordinary 
damage potential of nuclear weapons, 
which made defence strategies less feasible. 
In the bipolar world of the Cold War, de-
terrence was symmetrical and applied by 
roughly equally strong actors who were 
able to assess their motives sufficiently 
well. Cyber deterrence is multipolar and 
takes place between asymmetric opponents. 
Cyber capabilities are mostly opaque and 
easily proliferate. In this respect, cyber 
deterrence can fail more easily and is there-
fore not a reliable policy option. 
Attribution Problem 
Successful attribution is the most important 
prerequisite for deterrence, as it provides 
legitimacy and the threat of punishment 
with a certain strategic gravitas. However, 
it is often unclear who is behind cyber in-
cidents. Consequently, no one can be iden-
tified who can be threatened with punish-
ment. The attribution problem describes 
the difficulty of apportioning responsibility 
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of cyber attacks to an actor who has not 
previously communicated his intention and 
left no confession. 
The attribution problem affects both 
sides: When A cyber attacks D, D does not 
automatically know that it was A. If D re-
taliates digitally, again A does not neces-
sarily know that it was D. There is barely a 
target in digital space that is attacked by 
only one actor. Misperceptions are there-
fore quite common. There is also the risk 
that attackers may act under a false flag or 
claim to be responsible for attacks they did 
not carry out. In escalating geopolitical 
conflict situations, however, the role of the 
attribution problem is probably overrated. 
If, for example, servers are flooded in South 
Korea during a conflict episode with North 
Korea, it is easier to see who benefits from 
this (“cui bono”) than it is with covert espio-
nage operations. For effective deterrence, 
however, attribution must be incontestable, 
accurate and immediate. The more time 
that elapses between incident and attribu-
tion, the less legitimate a cyber retaliation 
by D. 
Demonstration Problem 
An attacker must be able to weigh up the 
costs of a potential punishment by D. 
Thus, A must be able to assess the damage 
potential of D’s cyber capabilities. For this 
very reason, military parades display kinetic 
weapons to the world and weapons tests are 
conducted for the whole world to see. This 
transparency principle, however, does not 
readily apply to cyber capabilities. Demon-
strating of cyber capability for reasons of 
damage threat jeopardizes the functioning 
of the capability. If a defender knows about 
the attack vector, he can adapt, which then 
makes an attack less useful. Offensive cyber 
abilities follow the law of diminishing re-
turns: any deployment of ability increases 
the chances that it will be less effective in 
the future. 
A low-threshold Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack may succeed the first 
time. However, if the attacker knows that 
retaliation is imminent, he or she can take 
critical systems off the network as a pre-
caution, or redirect the harmful network 
traffic. DDoS attacks are therefore only of 
limited use as a potential punishment. The 
same problem exists with 0-day capabilities, 
i.e. attacks that are based on unknown and 
therefore unpatched vulnerabilities. The 
more frequently they are used, the greater 
the probability that they will be exposed 
and thus made available to the entire 
world. With a patch for the vulnerability, 
the capability loses its effectiveness. 
This has two implications: 0-day capabili-
ties cannot be credibly demonstrated with-
out compromising their effectiveness. They 
are therefore only suitable for threatening 
punishment to a limited extent. The excep-
tion would be if an attacker had several 
hidden backdoors for accessing an enemy 
system. Then 0-day attacks could be used 
for “signaling”. Second, a defender can re-
purpose a published 0-day ability and direct 
it against the attacker. This suggests the risk 
of blowback for any attacker A, whether by 
D, or by any third party that repurposes the 
malware. 
Proportionality and 
Appropriateness 
Deterrence fails if the threat of punishment 
is not considered credible. Deterrence fail-
ure often leads to the use of capabilities 
and thus escalation. This raises questions 
about the proportionality, effectiveness and 
accuracy of cyber retaliation capabilities. 
How much objective damage must be in-
flicted so that A considers the costs of 
further offensive action to be too high? 
How does D know whether A considers 
threats against certain assets to be particu-
larly painful or not? A and D most likely 
have different perceptions about what 
assets are considered especially sensitive. 
These different perceptions make propor-
tional reactions difficult. There is no inter-
national consensus on how proportional 
cyber retaliation might be conceived. Thus 
there is an increased risk of escalation. 
The damage caused by cyber retaliation 
must be appropriate. If the damage threat-
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ened by D is too great, the probability of a 
renewed retaliation by A increases. It is well 
researched in political science, that escala-
tion spirals are often a consequence if a 
retaliation is perceived as inappropriate or 
too painful. In these cases, deterrence fails. 
If the threat of punishment is considered 
not costly enough and thus not credible, 
deterrence does not work either. Determin-
ing the correct measure is highly complex 
and also a function of the attribution prob-
lem: the lower the chance of being caught, 
the greater the threat of punishment by D 
must be, if A is to be convinced that an 
attack is not worth the potential cost. An-
other issue is that particularly costly assets 
are usually well protected, which makes 
effective retaliation harder. 
Lack of Controllability 
The damage potential of cyber capabilities 
is unreliable and difficult to control. It is 
complicated, although not impossible, to 
limit cyber capabilities to one target and to 
avoid collateral damage, for example in 
uninvolved third countries. This is particu-
larly true in time-critical situations. The 
effectiveness and thus the exact damage 
potential of cyber capabilities are often 
difficult to determine in advance. The 
potential damage is largely determined by 
the configuration of the target system. In 
this respect, it is often impossible to anti-
cipate how long a cyber attack can disrupt 
a system, for instance. 
This fact complicates the proportional 
and controlled use of such capabilities. 
This in turn increases the risk of deterrence 
failure. Even attacks such as Stuxnet (2010), 
which were carefully tailored to specific 
targets, also infected other systems world-
wide. Collateral effects such as WannaCry 
or NotPetya (both 2017) are habitual in 
cyber conflicts. No one can realistically 
estimate where else a certain system con-
figuration is in use. 
On the other hand, threat of punishment 
can be made too specific. If, for example, D 
is about to respond to a cyber attack on a 
dam by A with a retaliatory strike on a dam 
owned by A, A can take this off the grid as 
a precaution. It is difficult to find the right 
measure for potential damage that is nei-
ther too precise nor too vague, especially as 
the risk of deterrence failure is high. Fur-
thermore, the risk of escalation increases in 
asymmetric contexts. This makes cyber 
capabilities seem unreliable as a deterrent. 
High and Low-Level Deterrence 
There is no international consensus as to 
what cyber activities can be considered 
legitimate for deterrence (political vs. 
economic espionage vs. sabotage). Depend-
ing on the intensity of the activities, the 
chances of success for deterrence may vary. 
High level deterrence is aimed at prevent-
ing cyber activities that reach the threshold 
of an armed attack. This includes the worst-
case scenario of a digital surprise attack on 
strategic infrastructures, in which people 
die and high-grade physical destruction is 
the result (“digital Pearl Harbor”). Such an 
event has never happened in the more than 
thirty-year history of cyber-conflicts. The 
reason is that its consequences could not be 
measurable, costs would be too high, and 
an attacker would probably face blowback 
effects. 
First, such an attack would most likely 
be considered an act of war under interna-
tional law and would legitimize, for exam-
ple, acts of (collective) self-defence. Such 
a cyber attack would therefore probably 
escalate into a physical conflict, which is 
why states refrain from these activities in 
peacetime. Secondly, due to the inter-
dependent and highly networked Internet 
infrastructure, it cannot be realistically 
guaranteed that one’s own systems would 
not be similarly affected. In view of this, 
states have no interest in carrying out such 
strategic attacks in peace time, unless they 
can really gain something politically. Here, 
an implicit norm of restraint is effective, 
which is also noticeable in various inter-
national norm-setting bodies. In other 
words, deterrence can also work through 
norms that put a taboo on inappropriate 
behaviour. 
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However, this reluctance does not exist 
in the case of low-level incidents, below the 
threshold of an armed attack. States deliber-
ately design their cyber activities in such a 
way that they remain below this threshold 
and thus do not have an escalating effect. 
This category includes cyber espionage, 
hybrid measures, cybercrime, hacktivism 
and vandalism, which account for a large 
proportion of all cyber activity. It is con-
sidered unlikely that deterrence will be 
effective in low-threshold incidents such as 
espionage. There is a high likelihood of not 
being caught, especially since states are 
not interested in punishing espionage, from 
which they themselves benefit. 
Non-State Actors 
Low-level cyber activities are also commit-
ted by non-state actors. This is a major dif-
ference from deterrence in the nuclear age, 
where only states possessed nuclear capa-
bilities. The spectrum of actors ranges from 
script kiddies with low level skills to cyber 
criminals with medium abilities to cyber 
mercenaries with considerable capabilities. 
In addition, there are so-called proxy actors 
who attack targets either independently, or 
on behalf of a state. 
Deterrence only works if the motivation, 
interests, skills and return address of the 
opponents are known. With many “ad-
vanced persistent threats” much of this 
information remains opaque. Therefore, 
they cannot be effectively deterred. Theo-
retically, an effective deterrence policy 
would need to be tailored to each opponent 
among the thousands of cyber actors. This 
is impossible even for great cyber powers. 
It is well known from terrorism research 
that deterrence by punishment works, if at 
all, only against states, but not necessarily 
against non-state actors. Here, deterrence 
can produce a converse effect: the use of 
repressive force to combat terrorism often 
leads to more terrorism due to the per-
ceived injustices. The same can be observed 
in digital space. Not even offensively domi-
nant states such as the USA are in a posi-
tion to deter cyber attacks by non-state or 
state actors such as Russia or China. Deter-
rence of non-state actors follows the logic 
of criminological deterrence, which aims to 
reduce the frequency and intensity of in-
cidents without being able to prevent them 
altogether. 
There is another problem with non-state 
actors: not all of them act according to the 
same rational principles to which states, 
presumably, would act. Hackers, for exam-
ple, are not necessarily driven by rationale, 
but also by cognitive and normative motiva-
tions, such as the desire to gain fame and 
have fun (“Lulz”). 
Credibility and Escalation 
The threat of punishment not only needs to 
induce an accurate estimate of the expected 
costs, it must also be credible. If A does not 
believe that D, firstly, is technically capable 
of causing precisely measured costs with 
digital means or, secondly, lacks the poli-
tical will or resolve to endure the risk of 
escalation, deterrence fails. 
The credibility problem is even greater in 
cyber conflicts. Intentions and political will 
are often unclear, as much of government 
cyber activity is carried out by intelligence 
services and falls under cyber espionage. 
Thus, intention and political will remain 
hidden in many cyber-incidents. The intru-
sion into systems for espionage or sabotage 
purposes cannot be clearly distinguished 
from one another by the defender. This 
increases the risk that D perceives a rela-
tively harmless act of espionage as an 
attempt at sabotage, and thus overreacts. 
Furthermore, states are unable to objective-
ly assess their relative cyber-power. Cyber 
capabilities cannot be counted like tanks 
or warships. As “Rational Choice Theory” 
deterrence requires as complete informa-
tion as possible, which also includes an 
assessment of relative strength. This fails 
because of the secrecy and dual-use nature 
of cyber capabilities, which can be used for 
offensive and defensive purposes. 
Moreover, not all states are politically 
willing to engage in a “tit for tat” escalation 
dynamic of mutual retaliatory strikes. In 
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game theory, such conflicts are referred to 
as “chicken games”. In the classic scenario, 
two actors race directly towards each other 
in the car; the one who swerves first is the 
“chicken”, the coward. In democracies, the 
electorate usually does not support aggres-
sive foreign policy. Therefore, the executive 
often has less leeway to credibly threaten 
punishment. However, credibility also 
depends on past decisions and the reputa-
tion of a government. If the government 
has reacted hesitantly to aggression in the 
past, their future threats of punishment are 
less credible. 
The problem with gradual escalation in 
cyberspace is that the damage of the re-
taliatory attack must be somewhat higher 
than that of the previous attack. Since it is 
difficult to determine proportionality, there 
is a risk of collateral damage. It is unclear 
how escalation dynamics function in cyber-
space. There is no clear consensus among 
scholars about whether cyber capabilities 
can reach a similar level of escalation as 
physical weapons, or whether they are in 
principle de-escalatory. Some commenta-
tors argue that digital means tend to limit 
escalation because physical effects are diffi-
cult to produce, and the damage potential 
is more limited. Empirically, escalation is 
the most likely outcome of a deterrence 
policy that predominantly relies on the use 
of offensive means. 
Deterrence and “Persistent 
Engagement” in the US Doctrine 
Deterrence is thus not easily transferable 
to the digital domain. Hawks and national 
security advocates, however, disagree and 
believe that, in case of doubt, the posses-
sion of fearful cyber capabilities produces 
deterrent effects. They advocate a stronger 
offensive, because although the US is a 
formidable cyber power, it could not deter 
Russia from influencing the 2016 US presi-
dential election with cyber capabilities. In 
response to this deterrence failure, the 
Pentagon introduced a new cyber doctrine 
in 2018. This contains new concepts such as 
“defending forward”, “persistent engage-
ment” and “preparation of the battlefield”. 
The doctrine gives the US Cybercommand 
greater scope for offensive action, for which 
no presidential authorization is required. 
Defending forward means that networks 
are no longer defended in one’s own perim-
eter or territory, but on the systems of po-
tential attackers. This potentially includes 
unwitting third parties worldwide. Attacks 
against opponent systems are primarily 
used to gain intelligence in order to detect 
enemy attacks and burn capabilities at an 
early stage. 
“Persistent engagement” means binding 
enemy forces by permanently exposing 
them to attacks by American hackers. Op-
ponents would constantly have to defend 
themselves against American intrusion at-
tempts so that – according to the theory – 
they no longer have resources for their own 
offensives. Since no other state has such 
large personnel resources as the USA, the 
costs for attackers would be increased in 
this way. The doctrine clearly mentions 
China and Russia as potential targets for 
these measures. 
Defending forward and persistent en-
gagement are operational strategies that by 
themselves are not designed for strategic 
deterrence. However, it can be argued that 
the third concept, the “preparation of the 
battlefield”, might have deterrent effects. 
Opponent networks are to be penetrated 
in order to implant so-called back doors 
or logic bombs which can be exploited in 
future conflicts. A logic bomb is malware 
that lurks undetected in a network until it 
is activated at a later point in time. This 
implies a concrete threat of punishment. 
An opponent would then always have to 
ask themselves whether they have un-
covered all the attack vectors of the Ameri-
cans or whether they overlooked a hidden 
back door in their own network. In view 
of this uncertainty, attackers could refrain 
from serious cyber attacks, for example 
against critical infrastructures. Russia has 
recently complained vociferously about 
attempts by American hackers to penetrate 
the Russian power grid in order to implant 
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backdoors. The Kremlin also warned against 
an escalation in the cyber area. This is an 
indication that the USA’s new cyber doc-
trine, which is even more offensive than its 
predecessor called “active defence”, might 
be fuelling escalations. Whether it does so 
empirically remains to be seen. 
“Persistent engagement” was applied 
during the Midterm Elections of 2018. 
A central hub of low-level Russian cyber 
activity, the “troll factory” or Internet Re-
search Agency in St. Petersburg, was tempo-
rarily disrupted. However, it resumed its 
activities shortly afterwards. Tactically, the 
operation may have been a success. How-
ever, it is doubtful whether this form of 
deterrence has a strategic, i.e. long-term 
effect. It is to be expected that other cyber 
powers will now also invest more offensive-
ly and train more personnel in order to 
withstand or outmanoeuvre such “persis-
tent engagement”. 
The result would be an intensified arms 
race with the aim of always being able to 
mobilize more cyber forces than its rival. 
It remains to be seen whether persistent 
engagement will work against more than 
a handful of opponents at the same time. 
Low-threshold attackers cannot be stopped 
in this way either. 
Persistent engagement is a NOBUS strate-
gy – nobody but US – and thus cannot 
be easily replicated by other cyber powers. 
However, if all cyber powers were to pursue 
such a doctrine and start placing back doors 
everywhere, global cyberspace would be 
highly volatile. Backdoors are not exclusive 
and can potentially be exploited by any 
knowledgeable attacker. The cost of such 
an offensive policy for collective security 
would probably be higher than the theo-
retical gain in national security. The new 
doctrine thus goes far beyond the concept 
of “active cyber defence” of the Obama 
era. The concept was to react offensively to 
cyber attacks, but only to stop them at their 
source. This is also the concept that the 
German government is currently consider-
ing in a modified form. 
Cyber Deterrence by German 
Active Defence? 
Whether the mere possession of German 
cyber offensive capabilities would have a 
deterrent effect is doubtful. All the prob-
lems of attribution, demonstration, propor-
tionality and controllability of cyber retali-
ation described above still apply. Further-
more, it is hard to believe that Germany 
would be prepared to enter into a dynamic 
of escalation in cyberspace and then possess 
the necessary resolve. The culture of re-
straint in foreign and security policy is still 
very pronounced. The population is critical 
of a more active foreign policy or the as-
sumption of greater responsibility. This is 
particularly true if the use of force is in-
volved, whether physical or digital. 
Germany would probably have a credi-
bility problem, if it were to adopt a deter-
rence-by-punishment posture. A strong 
opponent would want to test whether Ger-
many is politically prepared to use active 
cyber defences as a deterrent and is willing 
to endure the consequences of an escala-
tion. So far, Germany lacks a political 
strategy on how to deal with such a situa-
tion. It would have to be tailored to all rele-
vant cyber threats and include the afore-
mentioned elements of threat communica-
tion as well as measures to provide propor-
tional and effective cyber reaction tools. 
Additionally, political will is required to use 
cyber capabilities as a form of punishment, 
even in the face of a probable escalation 
dynamic. Whether this actually exists is 
doubtful. 
Since an escalation strategy and political 
resolve for deterrence by punishment does 
not exist, “deterrence by denial” is a better 
strategy for Germany. This conclusion can 
be derived from the deficits of deterrence 
by retaliation itself. It fails inter alia be-
cause targets are too easily attackable. The 
bottom line is that it is always cheaper for 
the attacker to exploit weaknesses than not 
to do so. 
The first step towards an effective deter-
rent system should therefore be to increase 
cyber security and resilience in order to 
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make cyber attacks more costly. Of course, 
deterrence by denial faces several problems 
itself, so this will not be easy. As a second 
step, deterrence that accompanies foreign 
policy measures should be extended. There 
is much to suggest that deterrence, if at all, 
only works in concert with other measures 
– at best within the framework of an inter-
national cyber regime that does not yet 
exist. This would include international 
diplomacy, deterrence through norms or 
international interdependence or entangle-
ment, but also through regimes and orga-
nisations that subject state behaviour to 
rules. The efforts of cyber foreign policy 
should be intensified in this direction. 
However, this is a long way off. 
Cyber-conflicts are largely unregulated. 
Established norms for appropriate behav-
iour and red lines do not yet exist. Conse-
quently there is a high risk that deterrence 
will fail and trigger an escalation dynamic. 
Germany should therefore consider wheth-
er it wants to participate in this game, 
and whether it is prepared to endure any 
negative consequences. Cyber security by 
resilience is in any case the more long-
lasting strategy, since it works against all 
opponents in the same way, and does not 
need to be tailored to specific opponents. 
Summary 
The existence of offensive cyber capabilities 
alone does not act as a deterrent, especially 
if it is not credibly communicated that 
there is a willingness to use them. There 
are many pitfalls that make deterrence by 
punishment an ineffective policy concept 
with many risks. The risks of deterrence 
failure are more prevalent than in the ana-
logue world. Deterrence by punishment is 
most likely a strategy doomed to fail. 
If even the more active cyber powers like 
the US regularly fail with cyber deterrence, 
then a German cyber deterrence policy – 
due to the traditional restraint in foreign 
and security policy – cannot be expected to 
be successful either. As long as Germany 
has no escalation strategy and is not pre-
pared to endure the possible consequences 
of an offensive cyber deterrence policy, 
this approach should be avoided. Instead, 
German policy should continue to focus 
on “deterrence by denial” by hardening 
systems and building resilience. 
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